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ABSTRACT. Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument” purports to show that 
epiphenomenalism about the mental follows from premises that any nonreductive 
physicalist should find acceptable. Kim regards his argument as a reductio ad absurdum 
of nonreductive physicalism. We reconstruct and evaluate the latest version of Kim’s 
argument. We argue that the premises of Kim’s argument are much less innocent than 
they may appear. In particular, we single out for criticism an unstated assumption about 
the identity conditions of events, and we argue that this assumption could be seen as all 
by itself implying that nonreductive physicalism is false, thus begging the question 
against that position. It is also dubious, we argue, whether Kim’s unstated assumption is 
even consistent with one of the stated assumptions of his argument, “the principle of 
causal exclusion”, given a standard understanding of causal overdetermination. We 
conclude with some polemical remarks about the conception of causation presupposed by 
Kim’s argument—a conception that appears to depart from that at work in science and 
commonsense discourse.  
1. Introduction1 
Many philosophers have worried that physical causation may “exclude” 
mental causation—physical and mental causes “compete” for efficacy, and 
because of some principle (the causal closure of the physical domain, for 
example), physical causes inevitably “win”. This picturesque language is 
common, but explicit arguments, which identify prima facie plausible 
principles from which epiphenomenalism about the mental would logically 
                                                
1 We would like to thank Ian Gold for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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follow, are less so. Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience argument” represents 
perhaps the most influential attempt to construct such an argument. In Kim’s 
case, the argument is presented as a reductio ad absurdum of nonreductive 
physicalism. The present paper is an attempt to get clear on just what Kim’s 
supervenience argument is, and how, or whether, it works. We will only 
discuss Kim’s most recent formulation of the supervenience argument, or 
arguments—Kim gives us two “versions” of the argument (“Completion 1” 
and “Completion 2”). This formulation is found in ch. 2 of Kim’s most recent 
book, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Kim 2005; henceforth 
“PSNE”), in which, according to the chapter title, “The Supervenience 
Argument [is] Motivated, Clarified, and Defended”. We will attempt to give a 
reconstruction of the arguments that renders them deductively valid, so that 
every assumption on which we believe Kim relies is made explicit. We will 
show that the premises of Kim’s arguments are not nearly as innocent as they 
seem, and that one assumption in particular, which concerns the identity 
conditions of events, can only be viewed as begging the question against 
nonreductive physicalism, as that position has traditionally been conceived. 
Whatever else they may be, Kim’s arguments then are not reductios of 
nonreductive physicalism. Nor do they succeed in posing a problem about the 
possibility of mental causation by showing that we must either accept 
epiphenomenalism or reject one or another of a set of prima facie plausible 
metaphysical principles. Kim takes himself to have shown that the claims he 
calls his “substantive premises”, which are indeed prima facie plausible—at 
least relative to prevailing assumptions about causation, on which we will 
comment in the final section of this paper—are not consistent with the claim 
that mental events have causal efficacy. But what he has in fact shown is the 
inconsistency of a larger set of claims, some of which have no particular 
prima facie plausibility, even relative to the prevailing assumptions. We think 
the aforementioned assumption about the identity conditions of events is the 
least plausible among these. 
2. The “substantive premises” 
Kim thinks his arguments show that the following claims cannot all be true: 
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Irreducibility 
No mental property is identical with a physical property. 
 
Supervenience 
All properties strongly supervene2 on physical properties.3 In other words: 
necessarily, for all properties P, all objects x, and all times t: if x has P at t, 
then, for some physical property Pʹ, x has Pʹ at t and, necessarily, for all y and 
all times tʹ , if y has Pʹ at tʹ, then y has M at  tʹ. 
 
Closure 
If a physical event has a cause that occurs at a time t, then it has a physical 
cause that occurs at t.4 
 
Causal Efficacy 
Mental events sometimes cause other events. 
 
These assumptions, and Kim’s arguments, concern two different kinds of 
entities: properties and events. Like Kim, we assume that events are concrete 
instances5 of properties—not “instances” in the sense of objects that have the 
properties, but instances in something like the sense of havings of properties 
                                                
2 We will abbreviate “strongly supervenes” to “supervenes” in the discussion to follow, as 
we are not discussing any other varieties of supervenience. 
3 In PSNE the principle only says that all mental properties strongly supervene on 
“physical/biological” properties, but Kim, and we, are interested in formulating some 
minimal physicalist commitments, and a physicalist had better think that all properties 
strongly supervene on physical properties. 
4 Curiously, the principle Kim calls “Closure” is not a closure principle. To say that the 
physical domain is causally closed, in the usual technical sense, would of course be to say 
that every cause of a physical event is also a physical event—not an implausible principle, 
to our mind. Kim, however, thinks that to assume the physical domain to be causally 
closed in the literal sense would be to beg the question that is at issue in his argument: it 
would be “like starting your argument with mind-body causation already ruled out, at 
least for nonreductivists” (PSNE, 51). We think this is incorrect, for reasons that will 
become evident in sections 5 and 6, but for now we will join Kim in assuming only the 
weaker principle that every physical event with a cause has a synchronous physical cause, 
and calling it “Closure”. 
5 Kim prefers the term “exemplification”. See Kim (1976). 
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by particular objects at particular times.6 We take the following schema (at 
least when suitably restricted) to be a platitude: the event that is the having of 
property P by object x at time t exists if and only if x has P at t.7 
 According to Kim, Irreducibility, Supervenience, and Closure are 
shared commitments of all nonreductive physicalists. Thus Kim is posing the 
dilemma: either reject nonreductive physicalism or reject Causal Efficacy, 
viz., accept epiphenomenalism. 
 But things aren’t quite so simple, as there is a further premise in the 
argument which is not a characteristically nonreductive physicalist 
assumption: 
 
Exclusion 
No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any 
given time, unless it is a genuine case of overdetermination.8 
 
Kim says this is a “general metaphysical constraint” (p. 22), so presumably he 
thinks we should accept it whether we are nonreductive physicalists or not. 
Whether Exclusion is true or not is not perfectly obvious, and we’ll return to 
this matter in section 7. For now let us simply note that the appeal of the 
principle is perhaps due to the fact that it sounds tautologous: it sounds a lot 
like the claim that every event has at most one sufficient cause occurring at a 
given time unless it has more than one sufficient cause occurring at that time. 
3. Other general metaphysical constraints 
Though the assumptions Kim names and calls his “substantive premises” (p. 
41) end here, his argument requires several other assumptions that, like 
                                                
6 We shall not consider the possibility that events might be construed as “tropes”. For discussion 
see papers by Francesco Orilia and others in this volume. 
7 If P is an n-place relation, then x is an ordered n-tuple of objects. A restriction to the 
schema in terms of the notion of metaphysical contingency is contemplated in note 27. 
We find this restriction acceptable but not necessary. Our schema is similar to what Kim 
(1976, 35) calls the “existence condition”, but not quite the same: see note 27. 
8 This is Kim’s formulation exactly (PSNE, 42). Like Kim, we omit the word “sufficient” 
in the discussion to follow, but when we use the word “cause”, this should be understood 
as having an implicit “sufficient” in front of it. 
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Exclusion, are not clearly nonreductive physicalist commitments. We assume 
that he regards them, too, as “general metaphysical constraints”. One such 
assumption is what we will call: 
 
No Overdetermination 
For all properties F and G, if F is a supervenience base of G, then no event is 
causally overdetermined by (events that are instances of) F and G. 
 
Like Exclusion, this principle has a tautologous sound to it. When we say that 
an event is causally overdetermined by two other events, we mean that it has 
two causes that are independently sufficient for its occurrence. “Independent” 
here means, surely, at least that it would have been possible for each to occur 
without the other (and that if one had occurred without the other, it would 
have brought about the same effect). But it is a straight logical consequence 
of the definition of supervenience that instances of properties and their 
supervenience bases are not “independent” in this sense, as the instantiation 
of the base necessitates the instantiation of the supervening property.  
 Our evidence that Kim makes use of No Overdetermination is in the 
section titled “Why overdetermination is not an option”, in which Kim 
answers the question, Why do instances of mental properties and their 
supervenience bases not overdetermine their effects? His answer (p. 48): 
 
The usual notion of overdetermination involves two or more 
separate and independent causal chains intersecting at a common 
effect. Because of Supervenience, however, this is not the kind of 
situation we have here. In this sense, this is not a genuine case of 
overdetermination ... 
 
Since Kim thinks it is “because of supervenience” in the case under 
consideration, we assume he thinks that supervenience always precludes 
overdetermination, and that is what No Overdetermination says. 
 In addition, Kim must also assume some other principles relating 
supervenience to causation. We believe that he is assuming these: 
 
Supervenience-Causation (SC) I 
If c causes e and eʹ is a supervenience base of e, then c causes eʹ. 
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Supervenience-Causation (SC) II 
If c causes e and cʹ is a supervenience base of c, then cʹ causes e. 
 
These principles are perhaps more clearly expressed by means of a visual aid: 
see Figures 1 and 2. (We represent causation with a single arrow and 
supervenience with a double arrow pointing from the supervenience base to 
the supervening event.) SC I and SC II respectively tell us that when the top 
single arrow in each of Figure 1 and 2 occurs, so does the bottom single arrow. 
 
Figure 1: Supervenience-Causation I 
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       c 
                                                
         eʹ 
 
Figure 2: Supervenience-Causation II 
 
       c               
         
               
       e 
 
 
  cʹ     
   
One further remark about what SC I and SC II mean is in order. The 
principles speak of supervenience bases of events, though the usual notion of 
supervenience is defined for properties. What we mean by “eʹ is a 
supervenience base of e”, when e and eʹ are events, is that e and eʹ are 
simultaneous events involving the same object(s) and eʹ is an instance of 
some property which is a supervenience base of a property that is instantiated 
by e. More precisely: 
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The event in which x instantiates P at t is a supervenience base of the event in 
which y instantiates Q at t’ if and only if x = y, t = t’, and P is a 
supervenience base of Q. 
 
 We believe that Kim introduces SC I at pp. 39-41, where he expresses 
the principle by saying that an instance of a property can only cause an 
instance of a supervenient property “by causing its supervenience base” (p. 
40).9 The grounds for this claim have to do with the alleged fact that there are 
“two seemingly exclusionary answers” to the question “What is responsible 
for, and explains, the fact that [e] occurs on this occasion?” These two 
answers are: 
 
 (a) Because c caused e. 
 
 (b) Because eʹ, a supervenience base of e, is instantiated on this occasion. 
 
Kim says that a “tension [is] created by (a) and (b)” and that a “simple and 
natural way of dissipating” this tension is to conclude that c is a cause of e. It 
is not clear to us why these answers are “seemingly exclusionary”, or even 
that they are seemingly exclusionary (they don’t strike us as seemingly 
exclusionary),10 but we will leave it to others to reconstruct and evaluate the 
reasoning that leads Kim to accept SC I, because an adequate reconstruction 
of it would require a separate paper11 and we are not, at any rate, singling this 
assumption out for criticism. 
                                                
9 This does not have exactly the same meaning as our SC I, but we assume that whatever 
additional import Kim’s “by” has is irrelevant to the arguments; the assumption that the 
cause of an event e is also the cause of any event subvening e suffices for the purpose for 
which Kim needs the principle he expresses using the word “by”—namely, deriving step 
(3) in the two versions of the argument below. Since Kim’s principle differs from our SC 
I only in being stronger than it (“x does A by B-ing” entails “x Bs”), and the weaker SC I 
can fill the same role in the argument, we think we can safely ignore Kim’s “by”. 
10 See Marras 2007, section 3, for a discussion of related issues. 
11 At the bottom of p. 39 and the top of p. 40 Kim gives a highly impressionistic argument 
involving counterfactuals and modal operators for the conclusion that c’s occurrence must 
have had “something to do with” e'. The argument is open to several different 
interpretations, which we cannot give here for lack of space. Here the conclusion we are 
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 The reasoning supporting SC II is more transparent. SC II is introduced, 
obliquely, at p. 41, where Kim states that “There are strong reasons for 
thinking that [in the kind of situation represented in Figure 1] [c'] is a cause of 
[e']”. These reasons are: 
 
[c'] is (at least) nomologically sufficient for [c], and the occurrence 
of [c] on this occasion depends on, and is determined by, the 
presence of [c'] on this occasion. Since ex hypothesi [c] is a cause of 
[e], [c'] would appear to amply qualify as a cause of [e] as well. 
 
The idea appears to be this: c supervenes on c'; therefore c' is at least 
nomologically sufficient for c (this depends on reading the innermost modal 
operator in the definition of supervenience as “at least” nomological 
necessity). By assumption, c is a cause of e. Any event that is nomologically 
sufficient for the occurrence of a cause of an event is also a cause of it; 
therefore c' is a cause of e'. 
 The final “general metaphysical constraint” required by the argument, 
according to our reconstruction, is: 
 
Closure-Overdetermination 
If a physical event p has a cause c that occurs at t, then p has a physical cause 
p' that occurs at t such that p is not overdetermined by c and p'.  
 
Kim does not express Closure-Overdetermination anywhere in the text, but 
we attribute it to him because 1) it very neatly fills a gap in one of his 
arguments, and 2) it is highly plausible given Closure, which he does accept. 
For suppose that a physical event p has a cause c that is not physical. Then by 
Closure p has a physical cause p' synchronous with c. Is p overdetermined by 
c and p' ? If it is, then every event that has a nonphysical cause is 
overdetermined, and this seems absurd. It is of course logically possible that 
the physical causes posited by Closure sometimes but not always 
overdetermine their effects jointly with their concurrent nonphysical causes, 
                                                                                                                                                        
invited to draw is that this “something” is the causal relation. The final step in the 
argument, then, appears to be a kind of inference to the best explanation. 
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but this seems bizarre and arbitrary. The most natural conclusion is that 
Closure-Overdetermination is true.12 
4. The arguments 
Before giving us his arguments, Kim announces (p. 39): 
 
Properties as such don’t enter into causal relations; when we say “M 
causes M*”, that is short for “An instance of M causes an instance of 
M*” or “An instantiation of M causes M* to instantiate on that 
occasion.” Also for brevity we suppress reference to times. 
 
We will follow Kim in adopting these abbreviating conventions whereby “an 
instance of property M” and the like will be replaced by simply “M” and the 
like, as if properties were identical to their instances. In reading the argument 
to follow, it will be useful to pretend that the world is such that there are just 
two times, call them “t” and “Δt”, and that anything that is a cause of 
anything else occurs at t, and anything caused occurs at Δt—references to 
times thus becomes unnecessary. 
 Kim offers two versions of his argument, and we will discuss them in 
order. Our exposition differs from Kim’s in two respects: First, we present his 
“versions” of the argument as two distinct arguments, rather than as a “Stage 
1” followed by two alternative “completions”, as he does. Secondly, we will 
eliminate certain unnecessary steps, which we will comment on after we give 
each reconstruction. We will use sorted variables, so that “P”s, supplemented 
with primes as needed, are variables for physical properties and “M”s, 
likewise supplemented, are variables for mental ones. 
                                                
12 Compare Papineau (1993, 22-23), who also endorses this principle, effectively giving it 
the same justification. Papineau correctly observes that Closure-Overdetermination 
together with the claim that every mental event causes some physical event implies that 
we must either accept the token (not type) identity of mental and physical events or reject 
Exclusion (he does not use these labels, but this is what his argument amounts to). 
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4.1. Kim’s first argument 
In the first argument we introduce for a reductio the assumption that a case of 
mental-to-mental causation occurs: 
 
 (1) M causes M'. 
 
By Supervenience, we conclude that: 
 
 (2) There is a physical property P' such that P' is a supervenience base of 
M'. 
 
By SC I we conclude from (1) and (2) that: 
 
 (3) M causes P'.13 
 
Again, by Supervenience: 
 
 (4) There is a physical property P such that P is a supervenience base of M. 
 
By SC II, it follows from (3) and (4) that: 
 
 (5) P causes P'. 
 
But Irreducibility tells us that: 
 
 (6) M ≠ P. 
 
From No Overdetermination and (4) we get: 
 
 (7) P' is not causally overdetermined by M and P. 
                                                
13 This is not exactly what Kim’s step (3) says: it says “M causes M* by causing its 
supervenience base P*” (p. 40, Kim’s italics), but see our note 9.  
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Applying Exclusion to (5), (6), and (7), we conclude that: 
 
 (8) M does not cause P'. 
 
(8) contradicts (3), and we have a refutation of (1). In other words, we have 
derived (9) from our assumptions. 
 
 (9) It is not the case that M causes M'. 
 
Since M and M' were arbitrary mental properties, we must conclude the 
universal closure of (9): 
 
 (10) For all mental properties M and M', it is not the case that M causes M'. 
 
In other words, there is no mental-to-mental causation. To show that there is 
no mental-to-physical causation, we need a separate argument, which can be 
obtained from the argument just given by deleting lines (1) and (2) and taking 
(3) (“M causes P' ” ) to be the reductio hypothesis. These arguments together 
commit the nonreductive physicalist to a pervasive epiphenomenalism: 
mental properties do not cause any properties, mental or physical, to be 
instantiated.14 
 The argument just given fits into a larger reductio: one against the 
“substantive premises” of section 1 and the “general metaphysical 
constraints” of section 2. The conclusion (10) directly contradicts Causal 
Efficacy. We seem to have a demonstration that the “substantive premises” 
and the “general metaphysical constraints” cannot all be true. Supposing the 
metaphysical constraints to be off the table, we seem to be forced to reject 
either Causal Efficacy or one of the other “substantive premises”, which 
                                                
14 Or so Kim seems to think. If you think, as we do, that there are properties that are 
neither mental nor physical (say, biological properties), then you won’t agree that a 
pervasive epiphenomenalism is established yet. However, the argument goes through no 
matter what property—biological, chemical, aesthetic, whatever—is considered in place 
of Mʹ. 
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characterized nonreductive physicalism—in other words we must either 
accept epiphenomenalism or reject nonreductive physicalism. 
 The above reconstruction differs from Kim’s presentation of the 
argument in one important respect: in Kim’s presentation, Exclusion tells us 
that “we must eliminate either M or P as [P']’s cause”, whereafter Closure is 
called upon to tell us that it must be M that gets “eliminated” (pp. 42-43). But 
as can be seen above, Exclusion together with the preceding three lines yields 
the conclusion that M is not a cause of P, contradicting (3) [in Kim’s 
numbering, (8) (p. 41) contradicts (5) (p. 43)]. Citing Closure after a 
contradiction has been derived cannot contribute anything to the argument. 
Closure, then, is not actually needed as a premise in the first version of Kim’s 
argument.15 
4.2. Kim’s second argument 
Let us now turn to the second version of Kim’s argument. What follows is 
more paraphrase than reconstruction. Our lines (1) and (3)-(6) come from 
Kim more or less verbatim except for a change in the numbering, and as 
noted in note 7 above; the remaining lines are close paraphrases of lines in 
Kim’s argument. Lines (1)-(3) are what Kim calls “Stage 1”, and lines (4)-(7) 
he calls “Completion 2”. These taken together comprise Kim’s second 
argument. As before, we make for a reductio the assumption that there is a 
case of mental-to-mental causation: 
 
 (1) M causes M'. 
                                                
15 It might be suggested that, instead of SC II and No Overdetermination, Kim is tacitly 
appealing to Closure-Overdetermination, as we believe he is in his second argument (see 
below), to derive steps (5) and (7). However, there is no textual evidence for this. At pp. 
41-42, where these steps are derived, Kim makes no mention of a causal closure principle 
(except parenthetically at the top of p. 42, to announce that Closure will later be applied 
to “disqualify M as a cause of [Pʹ]”—the step that according to us is unnecessary). What 
Kim does cite here is the fact that P is “at least nomologically sufficient” for M (quoted 
above), and it is clear that he thinks this is so because M supervenes on P. This, and 
Kim’s later remarks about supervenience precluding overdetermination (p. 48), is to us 
decisive evidence that SC II and No Overdetermination are the operative assumptions 
here. 
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Again we know by Supervenience that: 
 
 (2) There is a P' such that P' is a supervenience base of M'. 
 
From (1) and (2) it follows by SC I that: 
 
 (1) M causes P'. 
 
By Closure, (3) implies that: 
 
 (4) P' has a physical cause—call it P—occurring at the time M occurs. 
 
But Irreducibility tells us that: 
 
 (5) P ≠ M. 
 
Next Kim asserts a line without justification [he introduces it only with 
“hence” (p. 44)]: 
 
 (6) P' is not overdetermined by P and M. 
 
Now, from (4), (5), (6) and Exclusion it follows that: 
 
 (7) M does not cause P'. 
 
(7) contradicts (3), and once again we must conclude that M did not cause M'. 
As M and M' were arbitrary mental properties, the conclusion must be that no 
mental-to-mental causation occurs ever, and the conclusion that no mental-to-
physical causation occurs either follows as in the second variant of the first 
argument. 
 In addition to the large problem shared by both versions of Kim’s 
argument discussed in the next two sections, there are two minor problems 
specific to the second version, as presented by Kim. 
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 The first problem is that not only is line (6) not justified, but it can’t be 
justified from assumptions explicitly made by Kim, his “substantive 
premises”. This is why we attributed Closure-Overdetermination to Kim. It 
would enable him to complete the argument as follows.16 
 
 ! 
 (4) Pʹ has a physical cause—call it P—occurring at the time M occurs—
and Pʹ is not overdetermined by P and M. [From (3) by Closure-
Overdetermination.] 
 
 (5) P ≠ M.  [From Irreducibility.] 
 
 (7) M does not cause Pʹ. [From (4) and (5) by Exclusion.] 
 
The second problem is not so easy to solve on Kim’s behalf. It is that Kim 
says that in his second argument “Supervenience is not needed as a premise” 
(p. 44), but this is not so: the second argument shares what Kim calls “Stage 
1” with the first argument, and Supervenience is needed in Stage 1. Without 
Supervenience, we cannot conclude that Mʹ has a physical supervenience base 
Pʹ. According to our reconstruction, the difference between the two 
                                                
16 There are, to be sure, other ways to complete the argument on Kim’s behalf, which are 
not implausible. The alternatives that come to mind, however, would have Kim appealing 
to the supervenience of M on P, whereas he insists that his second “completion is simpler 
than Completion 1” in part because “Supervenience is not needed as a premise” here (p. 
44). The main alternative we can think of for Closure-Overdetermination is: 
 
Closure-Supervenience 
If a physical event p has a cause c occurring at a time t, then p has a physical cause p’ 
such that 1) pʹ occurs at t and 2) pʹ is a supervenience base of c. 
 
This principle could be given a justification similar to the one we gave Closure-
Overdetermination: it could be argued that if the principle is not true, absurdly pervasive 
overdetermination will follow (unless mental events happen to be identical to physical 
events—a possibility we will consider later). For lack of space, we leave working out the 
exact justification for Closure-Supervenience, as well as how Kim’s second argument 
could be completed using it, as an exercise for the reader. 
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arguments is different from what Kim asserts: they differ with respect to two 
premises: the first argument makes use of SC II and No Overdetermination 
whereas the second does not; the second argument makes use of Closure-
Overdetermination whereas the first one does not. It is, of course, entirely 
possible that our reconstruction does not capture Kim’s intentions (see note 
15), but our goal has been to produce a reconstruction that is as close to the 
letter of Kim’s exposition as possible. 
5. The main logical problem 
Here is the most serious problem with Kim’s arguments. That the arguments 
appear to have a valid form is only an artifact of the abbreviating convention 
used by Kim—unabbreviated, the arguments are either invalid or 
enthymematic; we suppose the latter. We followed Kim in using the same 
variables for both properties and events, but now we will adopt a more 
explicit nomenclature, with uppercase letters (“M” and “P”, possibly 
supplemented with primes) for properties and lowercase letters for their 
instances (“m” and “p”, possibly supplemented with primes). Using this 
convention and adding material presumably elided by Kim, the steps of our 
first reconstruction are as follows, where the added material is in boldface. 
 
 (1) An instance m of M causes an instance mʹ of Mʹ [Assumption]. 
 (2) There is an instance pʹ of a physical property Pʹ such that pʹ is a 
supervenience base of mʹ. [From (1) by Supervenience.] 
 (3) m causes pʹ. [From (1) and (2) by SC I.] 
 (4) There is an instance p of a physical property P such that p is a 
supervenience base of m. [From (1) by Supervenience.] 
 (5) p causes pʹ. [From (3) and (4) by SC II.] 
 (6) M ≠ P. [By Irreducibility.] 
 (7) pʹ is not causally overdetermined by m and p. [From (4) by No 
Overdetermination.] 
 (8) m does not cause pʹ. [From (5), (6), and (7) by Exclusion.] 
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It is clear that (8) cannot be derived from (5), (6), and (7) by Exclusion: for (8) 
to be so derivable, (6) would have to say “m ≠ pʹ ”, not “M ≠ Pʹ ”. Nor does (8) 
follow from previous steps by any of the other assumptions that we have 
made explicit so far. However, one interesting conclusion does follow, 
namely: 
 
 (8ʹ) m = p. 
 
The argument is straightforward: since m and p are simultaneous causes of pʹ 
[by (3) and (4)], and m and p do not jointly overdetermine pʹ [by (7)], it 
follows by Exclusion that m = p. 
Since we assumed nothing about m except that it is a cause of some 
other mental event, what we have here is a proof that any mental event that 
causes another mental event is identical to a physical event. If we assume, 
instead of (1) that m causes a physical event, we can show that any mental 
event that causes a physical event must also be identical to a physical event. 
So we have shown that any mental event that causes any other event—mental 
or physical17—must be identical to a physical event. We have, in other words, 
a new argument for the token identity theory (or token physicalism) first 
proposed in Davidson 1970. Unlike Davidson’s argument for the theory, 
however, this one does not assume what Davidson called the “nomological 
character of causality”—that causes and effects must be related by 
deterministic laws—which many philosophers now find implausible, so 
perhaps this argument is more compelling than Davidson’s. 
But clearly Kim does not think he is giving us an argument for the token 
identity theory. He thinks he is showing the inconsistency of Causal Efficacy 
with the assumptions he attributes to the nonreductive physicalist and certain 
“general metaphysical constraints”. So what has gone wrong? It would be 
most implausible to suggest that Kim has simply confused properties with 
their instances because of his abbreviating convention. Rather, we suggest 
that Kim is making use of an unstated premise which he likely thinks of as yet 
another “general metaphysical constraint”. It’s not difficult to see what this 
hidden premise might be, as Kim makes it explicit in his earlier work on 
                                                
17 Again, this dichotomy may not be exhaustive, but the argument goes through no matter 
what kind of property we consider in place of M. 
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events. It is an assumption about the identity conditions of events. To express 
this assumption we must first introduce a bit of notation from Kim 1976: let 
 
[x, F, t] 
 
denote the event (if any) in which object x possesses property F at time t.18 
Using this notation, Kim (1976, 35) states what he calls the “identity 
condition”: 
 
Identity Condition  
[x, P, t] = [y, Q, tʹ] just in case x = y, P = Q, and t = tʹ. 
 
The Identity Condition implies that if F and G are distinct properties and f and 
g are instances of F and G respectively, then f ≠ g. Given this, we can 
conclude from steps (1), (4), and (6) of the first argument that m ≠ p, and we 
can complete the argument: 
 
 ! 
 (7) m ≠ p.  [From (1), (4), and (6) by the Identity Condition.] 
 (8) pʹ is not causally overdetermined by m and p. [From (4) by No 
Overdetermination.] 
 (9) m does not cause mʹ. [From (5), (7), and (8) by Exclusion.] 
 
With the introduction of the Identity Condition, however, the logical problem 
has been transformed into a dialectical problem for Kim. 
6. The dialectictal prolem 
The dialectical problem is that if Kim does include the Identity Condition 
among his assumptions, he can no longer claim to have shown that Causal 
Efficacy is inconsistent with nonreductive physicalism plus his metaphysical 
                                                
18 Again, if F is an n-place relation, x is an ordered n-tuple of objects. 
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constraints. The Identity Condition implies that each event is an instance of 
exactly one property19—which is expressed using Kim’s notation as:  
 
(F) If [x, F, t] = [y, G, tʹ], then F = G. 
 
Let us call any view of events that is committed to (F) fine-grained, and let us 
call any view of events committed to (F)’s denial coarse-grained. Let us now 
consider the question: What is nonreductive physicalism? According to one 
popular answer, nonreductive physicalism just is the conjunction of token 
physicalism with the denial of type physicalism.20 But to have a fine-grained 
conception of events is to assume that token physicalism implies type 
physicalism, 21  which is—if you accept that popular answer—well nigh 
synonymous with the statement that nonreductive physicalism is false. On this 
conception of what nonreductive physicalism is, Kim’s supervenience 
argument, if it is to be viewed as an argument against nonreductive 
physicalism, reduces to the claim that the nonreductive physicalist gets the 
identity criteria of events wrong, and the various assumptions about causation 
and supervenience do no work at all. 
This is not, of course, the only possible characterization of nonreductive 
physicalism,22 but it is certainly the classic one. Recall that token physicalism 
was an essential component of the positions defended in the two ur-
documents of nonreductive physicalism—Davidson 1970 and Fodor 1974. 
Psychophysical supervenience played no role in their arguments, and it only 
became a physicalist staple due to Kim’s subsequent work. And although Kim 
regards psychophysical supervenience as a minimal requirement for any form 
                                                
19 Namely, the property that Kim calls the event's “constitutive” property (as explained in 
section 7 below). 
20 Perhaps more accurately, the conjunction of token physicalism with Irreducibility, 
which is stronger than the denial of type physicalism. The falsity of type physicalism 
would only require the existence of one property that is not a physical property. 
21 As Fancesco Orilia also notes in his contribution to this volume (section 6). He also points out 
that Kim (1996, 60) explicitly recognizes this implication of his account of events. 
22 There are others that appeal to the idea of “realisation” or “constitution”, and that are 
compatible with a fine-grained conception of events. Cf. Boyd (1980, 82-87; 101-103), 
Cummins (1983, 22-23); Papineau (1993, ch. 1). 
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of physicalism (Kim 1998, 15),23 at the same time he no longer regards it as a 
sufficiently robust relation on which to base a physicalist theory of mind, 
particularly since supervenience can be defined over “multiple domains” 
(Kim 1988), rendering it compatible with various forms of parallelism 
(including epiphenomenalism). Notice, however, that if psychophysical 
supervenience is defined over a single domain of events, it entails token 
physicalism, for every mental event will be a physical event. At any rate, 
token physicalism remains a highly plausible candidate for a “minimal” 
physicalist commitment, and it still enjoys wide acceptance as a position that 
purposively distinguishes itself from type physicalism. Consequently, to 
construct an argument against nonreductive physicalism, one of whose 
premises effectively says that token physicalism implies type physicalism, is 
to adopt a rather odd dialectical strategy. 
We will consider in a moment the likely response that classic (token 
physicalist) versions of nonreductive physicalism lack the resources to 
account for mental causation (at least to the extent that they are silent about 
the causal role of properties), and so cannot be taken seriously as versions of 
nonreductive physicalism. But first there is a further problem with Kim’s 
argument that needs to be considered. 
7. A further problem 
The further problem is that the Identity Condition does not appear to be 
consistent with Exclusion—at least not if we understand “overdetermination” 
in a particular way, which seems to us natural. Exclusion implies that if an 
event has two distinct synchronous causes, then it is overdetermined by them. 
Brutus’s killing of Caesar (call this event “BKC”) and Brutus’s murdering 
Caesar (call this “BMC”) are synchronous events that have many common 
effects. But clearly BKC and BMC cannot overdetermine their common 
effects if we assume, as we have done, that overdeterminers must be 
                                                
23 Unsurprisingly, since on his fine-grained conception of events, physicalism must 
minimally require that mental events, albeit distinct from physical events, somehow 
“depend on” and be “determined by”, physical events. And “realisationist” versions of 
nonreductive physicalism obviously imply supervenience, since the realisation relation 
implies the supervenience relation (as Kim recognizes in his 1998, 23-24). 
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independent at least in that each could have occurred without the other (the 
murder could not have occurred without the killing). Now, because murdering 
and killing are two distinct properties (relations), the Identity Condition 
implies that BKC ≠ BMC. But because BKC and BMC are synchronous 
events with at least one common effect, and BKC and BMC do not 
overdetermine any of their effects, Exclusion implies that BKC = BMC.24 
This is not an outright logical inconsistency: no contradiction follows from 
the set {Exclusion, Identity Condition} alone. To avoid having to choose 
between Exclusion and the Identity Condition, and thus giving up his 
supervenience argument, Kim can argue that: (a) BKC and BMC are not 
synchronous, (b) BKC and BMC have no common effects, (c) BKC and BMC 
do, after all, overdetermine all of their common effects, or (d) the property of 
killing is the same as the property of murdering. None of these seems very 
promising to us.  
There is, however, a fifth alternative: (e) Kim could reply that the event 
description notation “[x, P, t]” used in the formulation of the Identity 
Condition is not to be understood in terms of the commonsense idea of an 
object having a property at a time, but in terms of a technical notion of a 
“constitutive property” of an event. The idea would be that the “P” in “[x, P, 
t]” always denotes a special, unique property “constitutive” of the event 
denoted by “[x, P, t]”, and that not every property x has at t can be a 
constitutive property of an event. It should be clear how this distinction would 
enable Kim to dodge the objection about BKC and BMC: the application of 
the Identity Condition in our argument for the distinctness of BKC and BMC 
would simply be invalid, because the argument does not have premises stating 
that killing and murdering are constitutive properties and hence we are not 
entitled to conclude that there exist any such events as [〈Brutus, Caesar〉, kills, 
t] and [〈Brutus, Caesar〉, murders, t] for us to apply the Identity Condition to. 
(Of course, if the Identity Condition and Exclusion are both to be maintained, 
it had also better be the case that at least one of killing and murdering is not a 
constitutive property, or else the argument could be supplemented with 
additional true premises to yield a refutation of the Exclusion/Identity 
Condition combination. We do not, however, have any arguments to show 
that murdering and killing are constitutive properties.) 
                                                
24 As one would expect under a coarse-grained conception of events. 
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 We believe that Kim would choose alternative (e) for coping with the 
present problem—the distinction between constitutive and other properties of 
events is, in fact, drawn by Kim in his 1976. Although in that paper Kim 
resists the identification of such events as BKC and BMC,25 he is open to the 
identification of other events involving the instantiation of distinct properties 
by an object.26 But choosing alternative (e) comes at a price: To begin, Kim 
would have to reject the principle that [x, P, t] exists if and only if x has P at t 
(an unrestricted form of what Kim 1976, 35, calls the “existence condition” 
for events).27 But if this principle is rejected, the meaning of Kim’s event 
                                                
25 On p. 44 Kim indicates that he would not identify Brutus’s stabbing Caesar with 
Brutus’s killing Caesar, and on p. 43 he says that “no stabbings are killings and no 
killings are assassinations”. These are similar enough to our examples. 
26 On p. 44 Kim concedes that Brutus’s stabbing Caesar and Brutus’s stabbing Caesar 
with a knife are the same event and he accordingly denies that the relation x stabs y with a 
knife is a constitutive property of the event denoted by “Brutus’s stabbing Caesar with a 
knife”, though it clearly is a property of the pair 〈Brutus, Caesar〉. 
27 Kim intends his “existence condition” schema to be understood with the restriction that 
only predicates that ascribe constitutive properties may be substituted for “P” (Kim 1976, 
34-37). Our own attitude about what events exist is liberal: we do not think our existence 
schema “The event in which x has P at t exists iff x has P at t” (section 2) is in need of 
restricting. Events in which properties of every kind are instantiated are required for the 
semantic analysis of natural language. Only some events can enter into the causal 
relation—only the metaphysically contingent ones, we suppose, viz. events e such that it 
is metaphysically possible both for e to have occurred and for e to not have occurred. For 
discussions of causation, our existence schema could be restricted so that only predicates 
that ascribe contingent properties (properties such that possession of them is a 
metaphysically contingent matter) may be substituted for “P”, and the semanticist’s 
events could be called something other than “events” (“schmevents”, for example), but 
this is a question of word choice, not substance. Such a restriction is intelligible inasmuch 
as the notion of metaphysical possibility is, and, it seems to us, it would correctly 
disqualify as events those schmevents that cannot enter into the causal relation. 
 Note that the question whether to restrict the schema 
 
(E1) The event in which x has P at t exists iff x has P at t, 
 
which we used in section 2, is different from that of whether to restrict the schema 
 
(E2) [x, P, t] exists iff x has P at t, 
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description notation is no longer clear: to understand it we would need an 
account of just what it is that makes some properties “constitutive” and others 
not, and none has been provided by Kim. We do not claim that such an 
account cannot be provided—the salient point is, rather, that for anyone who 
is worried about the coherence of the Exclusion/Identity Condition 
combination, as we are, the acceptability of Kim’s supervenience arguments 
will depend on his ability to produce such an account.  
What’s more, if Kim chooses (e), a new logical problem is introduced 
into the argument. The problem is that option (e) renders not only our 
argument against the coherence of the Exclusion/Identity condition 
combination but also Kim’s own supervenience arguments invalid, for exactly 
the same reason: if the Identity Condition is to be applied to m, M, p, and P in 
the supervenience arguments, the arguments will require two additional 
premises to remain valid: 1) that M is a constitutive property of m, and 2) that 
P is a constitutive property of p. Perhaps it will turn out that both claims fall 
out of the correct account of constitutive properties—even though since 
writing his 1976, Kim has indicated that, on pain of having to revise his 
property-exemplification account of events, he may have to deny that mental 
properties can be constitutive properties of events!28 However that may be, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
which is what Kim is concerned with in his 1976. The latter is a partial definition of a 
new piece of notation (“[”, “]”), call this the canonical event description notation. Ruling 
out a particular predicate “R” as an allowable substituend for “P” in (E2) would not have 
the consequence that there is no such thing as the event in which x has R at t; it would 
only have the consequence that that event, if it exists, is not denoted by “[x, R, t]”—it 
might be denoted by some other canonical event description. Presumably Kim would not 
impose the same restriction on the ordinary language (E1) as on the quasi-formal (E2), 
since in 1976 he wants to allow events to instantiate properties which are not constitutive 
of them (see our note 24). The restriction Kim proposes for (E2) differs from the one just 
contemplated for (E1) in that the former is not made using terms of which we have a prior 
understanding but by using the technical term “constitutive property”, which Kim does 
not explicitly define (see pp. 36-37). 
28 Kim notes that “a revision of the standard property-exemplification account of events 
(essay 3) [Kim 1976]” may be called for, “especially if mental properties, in spite of their 
multiple realisability, are accepted as legitimate event-generating properties. For on the 
standard account two property instances count as distinct events if the properties 
instantiated are distinct ... . Considerations advanced in Kim (1992) concerning 
disjunctive properties may be reason enough for excluding mental properties as 
constitutive properties of events” (Kim 1993, 364-65, note 5, our italics). 
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should be clear that if option (e) is chosen, some further work on Kim’s part 
will be required to make the supervenience arguments convincing. 
8. A problem about mental quausation? 
Kim is well aware, of course, that there are token physicalists who are not 
type physicalists. Does he think his supervenience argument has anything to 
say to them? Surprisingly, he does. In footnote 9 in ch. 2 of PSNE and 
elsewhere (e.g. Kim 1998, ch. 4) Kim hints that his argument could be 
reconstructed so as to have bite against nonreductive token physicalist 
positions. Unfortunately, however, Kim never gives us an explicit 
reconstruction. Though it would be obviously unfair to criticize an argument 
never explicitly formulated, we would still like to register the reason for our 
scepticism that a plausible argument along the lines Kim hints at can be made. 
Kim says (PSNE, 42, n. 9) that in the reconstructed argument, 
 
“An M-instance causes a P-instance” must be understood with the 
proviso “in virtue of the former being an instance of M and the latter 
an instance of P”. 
 
The argument would then be one about quausation (to use Terence Horgan’s 
(1989) term): causation qua something.29 But then we would need a quausal 
exclusion principle to replace Exclusion. What might it be? The trouble is that 
Kim’s suggestion does not determine a unique translation of Exclusion into 
quausal terms, and we are left wondering what principle he might have had in 
mind. The most straightforward rendering of Exclusion into quausal terms 
that we can think of is: 
                                                
29 The closest Kim comes to providing an argument is in the following: “Suppose that a 
certain event, in virtue of its mental property, causes a physical event. The causal closure 
of the physical domain says that this event must also have a physical cause. We may 
assume that this physical cause, in virtue of its physical property, causes the physical 
event. The following question arises: What is the relationship between these two 
causes...?” (1989, 280). Kim goes on to suggest that, barring overdetermination and given 
closure, the physical cause excludes the mental one unless the mental and the physical 
properties of the two causes are identified. The implication here is that the mere “token 
identity” of two causes as coarse-grained events won’t give us a solution to the problem; 
what needs to be identified is “that in virtue of which” the cause causes what it does. 
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Quausal Exclusion 1 
Except in cases of overdetermination, if F and G are distinct properties, and 
an instance c of F causes an event e in virtue of c’s being an instance of F, 
then it is not the case that c causes e in virtue of c’s being an instance of G.30 
 
This principle, however, has no intuitive support that we can find, and we 
think it would be unfair to attribute it to Kim. Similar principles have been 
ably criticized by Fodor (1989), Jackson and Pettit (1990; see (B) at p. 110 for 
a straightforward counterexample), Heil and Mele (1991), and Yablo (1992), 
and we have little to add to those critiques beyond pointing out that a problem 
analogous to the one considered earlier about BKC and BMC would arise 
again: given Quausal Exclusion 1, where e (for example, Calpurnia's grieving) 
is an effect of Brutus' action of killing/murdering Caesar, BKC causing e in 
virtue of BKC’s being a murdering of Caesar would exclude BKC’s causing e 
in virtue of BKC’s being a killing of Caesar—surely something we should 
have no reason to claim. 
Let us instead look to Kim’s other writings to see if a quausal exclusion 
principle might be derived from other claims he has made. In Kim 1988 we 
find a “principle of explanatory exclusion” (PEX), which states: “No event 
can be given more than one complete and independent explanation” (p. 239). 
There Kim also concedes that PEX is “something that many will, I’m afraid, 
consider absurdly strong and unacceptable” (ibid.). Absurdly strong or not, if 
we also assume Kim’s “explanatory realism”,31 we could try to make a case 
for the following principle on the basis of PEX: 
 
Quausal Exclusion 2 
Except in cases of overdetermination, if F and G are distinct and independent 
properties, and an event c causes another event e in virtue of c’s being an 
                                                
30 This is essentially the principle attributed to Kim by Marras, 2000, p 145, as principle 
(Q*). Note that is addition to a quausal exclusion principle, the reconstructed argument 
would also require analogous revisions of Closure and/or of SC I and SC II, as well as of 
any premise to the effect that a mental (physical) event causes another event. (E.g., 
Closure would become Quausal Closure: “If a physical event e has a cause that occurs at 
time t, then it has a physical cause c that occurs at t and that causes e in virtue of some 
physical property of which c is an instance”.) 
31 Which is itself far from obvious. See Marras 1998 for discussion. 
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instance of F, then it is not the case that c causes e in virtue c’s of being an 
instance of G. 
 
For lack of space we will not attempt to show just how Quausal Exclusion 2 
might be derived from PEX; the interested reader may consult the argument 
of Macdonald and Macdonald (2006, 544-545), which uses PEX to justify a 
principle very similar to Quausal Exclusion 2. Rather, our main point about 
Quausal Exclusion 2 is that, however plausible or implausible PEX may be, 
and whatever difficulties might be involved in using PEX to justify Quausal 
Exclusion 2, if Quausal Exclusion 2 is the principle that will be used in the 
new supervenience argument, then there is a straightforward reply. The reply 
has been around in the mental causation literature, in various forms, for a few 
years.32 It is simply this: Quausal Exclusion 2 cannot be used to argue that the 
causal efficacy of mental properties is “excluded” by that of their 
supervenience bases, because such an application of Quausal Exclusion 2 
would require mental properties and their supervenience bases to be 
independent. By the very definition of supervenience, there is a necessary 
connection between mental properties and their supervenience bases, so 
mental properties are not independent of their supervenience bases.  
The “quausal” formulation of the mental causation problem aims to 
highlight the point that mental causation “ultimately involves the causal 
efficacy of mental properties” (Kim 1998, 37), and Kim’s challenge to the 
token physicalist is to explain how a mental event, even if token-identical 
with a physical event, can cause what it does in virtue of the mental properties 
it instantiates (where these are distinct from the physical properties it 
instantiates), and why the causal efficacy of the mental properties is not 
preempted by the efficacy of the physical properties. However, to merely 
complain that token physicalism, as such, lacks the resources to account for 
the efficacy of mental properties33 is not to the point: the relevant issue is 
                                                
32 See Macdonald and Macdonald 2006, 566, Bennett 2003, and Papineau 1993, ch. 1, 
sections 6 and 7. 
33 This was, essentially, Kim’s (1993) complaint against Davidson’s anomalous monism. 
While granting that Davidson was “arguably right” in denying that anomalous monism 
entails the causal inertness of mental properties, he nonetheless insists that anomalous 
monism “fails to provide mental properties with a causal role” (p. 20). As argued in 
Marras (1997), this was merely a failure of omission: Davidson’s monism was not 
intended to provide a theory of the causal efficacy of mental properties. 
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whether token physicalism can coherently be supplemented with additional 
“substantive premises” (e.g., about the physical realisation of higher-level 
properties, or their implementation in physical mechanisms, etc.)34 so as to 
give mental properties a causal role—a role which token physicalism as such 
does not preclude.  
9. Is there a problem about token identity? 
Why has the fact that Kim’s supervenience argument begs the question 
against nonreductive physicalist positions that assume token identity not 
received wide attention? There are two fairly common beliefs that might be 
responsible for this. One is that “the problem of how events should be 
individuated” “plays no essential role in questions about epiphenomenalism” 
(Shapiro and Sober forthcoming, n. 3)—and this is just what Kim appears to 
think. The other is that there is something wrong with token physicalism, and 
that nonreductive physicalism ought to be formulated in terms of a Kim-style 
fine-grained conception of events. Our response to the first belief is implicit 
in what we said in the previous two sections: the supervenience arguments 
Kim actually gives us depend essentially on an assumption he makes about 
the identity criteria of events, and it is questionable whether Kim can 
construct a convincing alternative to the actual supervenience arguments 
without making that assumption. Clearly, then, the way we individuate events 
does play an essential role at least in the questions about epiphenomenalism 
raised by Kim. Our response to the second belief is that there quite simply are 
no good arguments against token physicalism; or, less tendentiously and more 
to the point, that there are no good arguments against token physicalism that 
are not equally good arguments against type physicalism. 35  (This is 
                                                
34 See, e.g., Fodor 1989, McLaughlin 1989, Jackson and Pettit 1990, Hardcastle 1998.  
35 Kripke’s well-known modal arguments against the identity theory, for example, can 
equally be directed against the type and the token identity theory. So can any of the 
familiar arguments based on the conceivability/possibility of zombies and/or disembodied 
minds. Such arguments must of course be distinguished from arguments against 
nonreductive (versus reductive) physicalism, either of the token identity variety or of the 
realisation variety. These latter arguments need to show not that token identity is false, 
but that the denial of type identity is false. Typically these aim to show that the multiple 
 127 
unsurprising, since type physicalism entails token physicalism; so if the latter 
is shown to be false, so is the former.) The arguments against token 
physicalism are notoriously controversial,36 and at any rate, they are of no 
help to a friend of type physicalism like Kim since, as just remarked, if any of 
these arguments defeat token physicalism, they defeat type physicalism.37  
                                                                                                                                                        
realisability thesis is false, or that it does not stand in the way of a reductive account of 
mental properties. See, e.g., Kim 1992, Richardson 1979, Bickle 1998. 
36 For a recent, forceful critique of such arguments see Papineau 2002. 
37  Consider, for example Burge’s (1979) argument against token physicalism. The 
argument is something like this: Tokens of those mental states that are broadly 
individuated cannot be identical to tokens of the physical states that realize them because 
the realizing properties are plausibly intrinsic ones. Suppose, for example, that Joe’s 
belief that p at time t is realized by Joe’s brain state S (“Joe’s S” for short). If the content 
of Joe’s belief is broadly individuated, then there is a possible world w in which Joe is 
intrinsically exactly like he is in the actual world, so he has S at t in w, but in which Joe’s 
does not believe that p at t because of some difference in his environment. Now it would 
seem that on the basis of this we can argue: 
 
(1) It is possible Joe’s belief that p occurs but Joe’s S does not occur (premise). 
(2) It is possible that Joe’s belief that p ≠ Joe’s S (from (1) by Leibniz’s law and 
propositional modal logic). 
(3) Joe’s belief that p ≠ Joe’s S (from (2) because objects that are possibly distinct are 
actually distinct). 
The argument can clearly be reformulated so as to apply not just to Joe’s (token) belief 
that p and to Joe’s S, but also to the types (properties) believing that p and being in S. 
After all, “It is possible that Joe’s belief that p occurs but…” is necessarily equivalent to 
“It is possible that believing that p is exemplified by Joe but…” 
 That having been said, we note that the argument is not particularly convincing 
when applied (as intended) against token physicalism. That is, while it is true that if the 
argument is successful in refuting token physicalism, it is also successful in refuting type 
physicalism, we do not think that the argument is successful against token physicalism. 
The trouble is that, as a matter of modal logic, in order for the move from (1) and (2) to 
(3) to be valid, or, equivalently, in order for ‘¯a ≠ b → a ≠ b’ to be a logical truth, ‘a’ 
and ‘b’ must be rigid designators. However, the token events at issue in the argument are 
denoted by definite descriptions, which are not rigid—at least not rigid de jure. Definite 
descriptions may, however, be rigid de facto if they happen to pick out their designata by 
their essential properties (e.g. ‘the even prime’ is rigid de facto). Burge of course 
recognizes this—he claims that tokens of beliefs have their contents essentially (Burge 
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The reasons that have led some philosophers to prefer “token 
realisationism” to token identity physicalism are far from persuasive, and/or 
are largely motivated by a prior commitment to a fine-grained conception of 
events. Boyd (1980), for example, claims that his realisationist version of 
nonreductive physicalism enables him to cope with Kripke’s arguments 
against identity theories. But he himself shows, in the same paper, how 
identity theories are quite able to resist Kripke’s arguments; so what makes 
realisationism preferable to token identity? And Papineau (1993, 24) 
explicitly acknowledges that his reason for preferring realisationism is that, 
qua terms of causal relations, events are best viewed as fact-like entities, or as 
structured, fine-grained events à la Kim. If so, how we individuate events 
again does, pace Kim, play a role in the mental causation debate. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1979, 75), but this is far from obvious. In fact, the very externalist considerations Burge 
brings to bear on token physicalism seem to militate against this conclusion. It seems to 
us entirely natural to describe the moral of Burge (1979) by saying things like: “There are 
counterfactual circumstances in which Joe’s belief that p at t would have had a different 
content”, “If the stuff in the oceans had been XYZ, then (the present token of) my belief 
that water is wet would have had a different content than it in fact does”. (Note that the 
argument would be valid if the descriptions in (1) were read as having wide scope relative 
to the modal operator. However, if (1) were read this way, it would receive no support 
from Burge’s externalist considerations: the latter only show that the mental properties of 
a person can come apart from the physical properties that, in the actual world, realize 
them. They do not show that the events in which these properties are instantiated in the 
actual world are distinct in some other world.) 
 If, on the other hand, the argument is made using definite descriptions that 
designate properties instead of events, there is no problem about rigidity. Any property—
at least any property we have a predicate for—can be designated by a rigid definite 
description that makes use of the predicate we would normally use to ascribe the property. 
For example “the property of being red”, or “the property red” are rigid: in no world does 
“the property of being red” designate any property other than redness. Similarly, “the 
property of believing that p” in no world designates anything other than the property of 
believing that p.	
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10. Concluding (polemical) remarks 
Our critique of Kim’s exclusion argument aimed to show that the reasons he 
gives for holding that nonreductive physicalism entails epiphenomenalism are 
not convincing, resting as they do on a conception of events that rules out 
from the start a classic and perfectly coherent version of nonreductive 
physicalism that we believe still merits consideration—a conception of events 
that is, furthermore, only dubiously consistent with another central premise of 
his arguments. To have accomplished this aim is not, of course, to have 
provided a positive account of how mental causation is possible within the 
confines of nonreductive physicalism thus construed. To provide such an 
account one would have to explain, minimally, how mental events can have 
causal efficacy not merely in virtue of their being token-identical with 
physical events, but also in virtue of the mental properties they instantiate. 
Although the question of how mental causation is possible is surely a 
legitimate one, it is not one that we need to address here; it suffices to have 
shown that there is no compelling argument that Kim (or anyone else, to our 
knowledge) has provided for the conclusion that a satisfactory account of 
mental causation cannot be provided within the bounds of nonreductive 
physicalism. 
Still, while the question of how mental causation is possible is 
legitimate and important, there is something perplexing about the almost 
exclusive attention that it has received from Kim and others for so many years. 
There is no prima facie reason to suppose that the question of how mental 
causation is possible is more special, or more difficult, than the question of 
how biological, or chemical, or, indeed, physical causation is possible.38 
Moreover, Kim’s worry that physical causation may somehow “exclude” 
mental (or other higher-level) causation presupposes that there is physical 
causation, and that it is somehow less problematic than mental or other 
higher-level causation. These presuppositions, however, cannot be taken for 
granted. In fact, we think this stance gets matters backwards: if the reality of 
any causation can be taken for granted, we think the reality of causation at 
                                                
38 That Kim thinks that the problem of mental causation poses special difficulties is 
evident in ch. 3 of his 1998 book, especially in view of his claim that the supervenience 
argument “does not generalize” to other domains beyond the mental.  
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higher levels, including the mental, should be, whereas the reality of physical 
causation should be considered an open question.39  
The reason is this. The concept of causation we are interested in is not a 
philosophers’ invention; it does not get its content from metaphysical 
principles—Closure and others—of the sort that are discussed in the literature 
on mental causation, but from its use in science and common-sense 
understanding. And if we are interested in finding out what really causes 
what, we should listen to what science in particular has to say about this 
matter. Now it happens that the concept of cause is found only in the special 
sciences, and never in fundamental physics. That being so, we should accept 
the reality of higher-level causation (the kind that the special sciences talk 
about), including mental causation, and remain noncommittal, until some 
arguments are provided, on the reality of physical causation. Unless physics 
changes dramatically and its practitioners begin to talk about causation, these 
arguments will have to be philosophical arguments. Perhaps the most 
straightforward argument for physical causation is one that assumes token 
physicalism and the reality of causation at some higher level, call it L (L 
could be, but doesn’t have to be, the mental level): all L-causes are events, 
and all events are physical, so some physical events are causes. But this still 
leaves open the question of whether physical events cause other events in 
virtue of being instances of particular physical properties. 
These may seem like strange things to say, but consider the fact that 
physical events are instances of physical properties. We assume that physical 
properties are those properties that are ascribed by predicates that occur in 
quantum physics (or in whatever the correct lowest-level theory turns out to 
be), or by open sentences containing only such predicates. Instances of 
physical properties are virtually never cited as causes, at least not under their 
physical descriptions. Thus it takes an argument to show that instances of 
physical properties can be causes. If we assume that all instances of higher-
level properties, some of which are commonly cited as causes both in 
(higher-level) science and common sense, are identical to instances of 
physical properties, then it is clear that there is physical causation all around 
us; but this still leaves all the physical events that are not identical to 
instances of any higher-level properties unaccounted for (presumably there 
                                                
39 For a similar stance and a thorough discussion of the issues, see Ladyman and Ross 
2007, ch. 5. 
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are many such physical events), as well as the causal powers of the physical  
properties themselves. Trying to identify the causes and effects, and the 
causally efficacious properties, in the world as described by physics is not an 
easy task; it would require us to have a correct and informative analysis of the 
conditions under which one event can be said to cause another, as well as of 
the conditions under which a property instantiated in a cause can be said to be 
causally efficacious, and it’s not obvious that we have such an analysis.40 
Not only is the reality of physical causation less obvious than the reality 
of higher-level causation, but arguments similar to those found in the mental 
causation debate could be used for “excluding” physical causation. The 
problem could be put in terms of a Malcolm 1965-style explanatory exclusion 
principle: given that we can have, in principle, a complete covering-law 
explanation for every physical event in the vocabulary of quantum physics, 
and that these explanations make no use of the concept of cause, what role is 
there left for physical causation to play? Physical causation is “excluded” by 
the initial conditions and the laws of physics, which determine, without 
positing any metaphysical glue binding one event to another, the occurrence 
(or objective probability of the occurrence) of every physical event.  
Not that we think this is a good argument, but its similarity to some of 
the arguments used to motivate epiphenomenalist worries about mental events 
and properties should raise some questions about the seriousness of those 
worries. 
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